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Introduction
In many countries, policy makers stimulate self-employment to create jobs (see, e.g., Congregado et al. 2010 , European Commission 2013 , Kritikos 2014 . More often than not, self-employment starts with solo self-employment. That is, entrepreneurs usually start as own-account workers who do not employ other workers. For instance, in Germany, Europe's biggest economy, two thirds of all start-ups are launched by solo self-employed (cf. Metzger 2014) . Among subsidized start-ups, this share is even higher. About 70% of founders who received a start-up subsidy still have not employed other workers 19 months after start up (cf. Caliendo et al. 2012 ). Not surprisingly then, solo self-employment is the dominant form of self-employment in many countries. In Germany, about 57% of all self-employed were solo self-employed in 2012 (cf. Brenke 2013) , and this share is even higher in the US, the UK, and Canada, where it is between 70 and 80% (cf. Parker 2009, p. 293) .
Although solo self-employment is a common form of self-employment, the literature does not yet provide a clear understanding of the dynamics of solo self-employment. In consequence, there is a gap in knowledge about what are the effects of experiencing solo self-employment in the past on future labor market outcomes. Such knowledge is important for policy makers aiming at stimulating job creation. In general, the literature distinguishes between two mechanisms that may explain individuals' transitions between labor market states, both of which have different policy implications (see, e.g., Prowse 2012) . First, if the past experience of solo self-employment has a causal effect on the probability of solo self-employment in the future, then policy measures such as start-up subsidies will have lasting effects even after the subsidies ended. This mechanism is termed true (or genuine) state dependence in the literature (see, e.g., Heckman and Borjas 1980, Heckman 1981) . However, if persistence in solo self-employment can fully be explained by individual characteristics that determine both solo self-employment in the past and in the future alike, such policies will hardly have long-term effects. The literature refers to this second mechanism as spurious state dependence.
Subsidizing self-employment often brings individuals in solo self-employment initially. Such policies may have further advantageous effects when the subsidized self-employed become employers and create jobs for others in the future (the so-called "double dividend", see, e.g., Caliendo and Kritikos 2010) . Such a double dividend is likely to occur in the presence of true cross state dependence, i.e., if experiencing solo self-employment in the past increases the probability of becoming an employer in the future, for instance because individuals acquire entrepreneurial knowledge and skills while working in solo self-employment (see, e.g., Minniti and Bygrave 2001) .
Previously, only few studies have empirically investigated state dependence in selfemployment and we are not aware of any paper studying (cross) state dependence in solo self-employment. Among the few studies analyzing state dependence in self-employment, Henley (2004) and Caliendo and Uhlendorff (2008) find evidence for state dependence in the UK and Germany, respectively. Millán et al. (2014) using ECHP data from 1994 to 2001 estimate competing risks models. They distinguish between own-account workers and job creators and find persistence in entrepreneurship. Congregado et al. (2010) investigate the determinants of transitions between solo self-employment and other labor market states but do not address state dependence in solo self-employment and whether it may be a stepping-stone to employership. Buschoff and Schmidt (2005) provide descriptive evidence on transitions from solo self-employment in five European countries. There is, thus, a clear lack of evidence on whether solo self-employment exhibits true state dependence and on its role as a stepping-stone to employership. This paper fills this research gap by making the following contributions. First, we contribute to the international literature by estimating the extent of true state dependence in solo self-employment, an issue which, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been investigated by prior research. Second, we contribute a comprehensive picture of the dynamics of solo self-employment by modeling transitions between four different labor market states: solo selfemployment, employership, paid employment, and non-employment. This four-state categorization allows us to differentiate alternative pathways into, within, and out of solo self-employment.
In particular, we examine to what extent solo self-employment serves as a stepping-stone to employership by identifying cross state dependencies between these states. Finally, we provide evidence on how dynamics of solo self-employment differ between men and women.
The analysis proceeds as follows. In section 2, we introduce our estimation strategy. Section 3 provides information on the data set used and shows descriptively that there is, for both men and women, pronounced persistence in solo self-employment and that solo self-employed are much more likely to become employers than paid employees are. Section 4 presents the results of a dynamic multinomial logit models and provides evidence that the extent of true (cross) state dependency is rather small. We discuss our findings and draw some policy implications in section 5.
Estimation strategy
We apply a dynamic multinomial logit model to estimate the determinants of transitions between four labor market states. The model assumes that in every time period an individual chooses the labor market state (solo self-employment, employership, paid employment, non-employment) that yields the highest utility. We specify a random utility function for individual i in state j at time t as follows:
The utility function includes a vector of observed individual characteristics, x it , and a set of pre- We assume a i j to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ 2 a . Hence, the probability that individual i is in state j at time t conditional on observed and unobserved characteristics and the labor market state in t − 1 can be written as (for a general derivation of choice probabilities, 1 Including α i j in the utility function also relaxes the restrictive independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption of the conventional multinomial logit model by capturing correlations in individual random effects across alternatives (for further discussion, see Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2003) . 2 Wooldridge (2005) includes a vector of all explanatory variables across all periods in the model for the unobservables. This approach can, however, only be applied to a balanced panel data set. A common approach in the literature is, therefore, to use within-means of time-varying explanatory variables (for a discussion, see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2013 ).
see Train 2009 ).
We estimate the coefficients in equation 2 using a dynamic multinomial logit model with random effects, which includes additional covariates for the auxiliary model for the unobserved heterogeneity. Estimation is carried out with the command -gsem-available in Stata 14.
We use average predicted probabilities to calculate state dependence in transitions, using the observed covariate values of each individual. The prediction is calculated by integrating the unobserved heterogeneity out of the likelihood. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. We report 95% confidence intervals to assess the uncertainty of the prediction.
Following Immervoll et al. (2015) , we define true state dependence in solo self-employment as the difference between the probability of being solo self-employed at time t conditional on being in that state in t − 1 and the probability of being solo self-employed at time t conditional on being in an alternative state in t − 1. In doing so, true state dependence can be interpreted as the causal effect of experiencing solo self-employment in the past on the probability of experiencing solo self-employment in the future. Formally, we calculate true state dependence (TSD) in solo self-employment as
− P(solo self-employment t |alternative status t−1 ).
Likewise, we calculate cross state dependence (CSD) between solo self-employment and employership as
− P(employership|alternative status t−1 ).
Data and descriptive evidence
This study uses data from the Socio-Economic Panel ( We consider transitions between four different labor market states. First, we distinguish between two types of self-employment (excluding farmers), self-employment with employees and self-employment without other employees. We refer to these states as employership and solo self-employment, respectively. The two alternative states are paid employment (excluding civil service) and non-employment, i.e., unemployment or non-working (but excluding pensioners and individuals in education). Table 1 shows the distribution of labor market states. On average, 4.6% (3%) of men (women) are solo self-employed while about 6.2% (1.6%) of men (women) are employers. Almost 80% of men and 68% of women are paid employees. The share of men (women) in non-employment is decreasing from about 10% (32%) to about 8% (19%) over the observed period, mirroring among others the favorable labor market performance in Germany in recent years. The distribution of states differs considerably between men and women, with women having lower labor market participation and self-employment rates than men. Since labor market participation differs between men and women, we perform separate analyses by gender. For women, persistence in solo self-employment is of similar magnitude (32% are still solo self-employed after five years, cf. Figure 2 , Panel C). However, they are much less likely to become employers. Only 14% of solo self-employed women are employers after five years, compared to 30% of men. That said, this probability is still much higher than the corresponding probability of becoming an employer when initially in paid employment (1% after five years, cf. In sum, we observe that solo self-employment exhibits substantial persistence, albeit considerably less than paid employment. Even more important, the transition probability to employership is much higher from solo self-employment than from paid employment and non-employment, respectively, which may indicate that solo self-employment is a stepping-stone to employership.
However, it is unclear up to now whether it is really solo self-employment that increases the likelihood of being self-employed (solo or with other employees) in the future or just individual characteristics that influence both the decision to become solo self-employed and to stay solo selfemployed or to become an employer later on. To answer this question, we need to take account of unobserved and observed individual characteristics in multivariate analyses. Table 2 displays the variables we use in the multivariate analysis. Consistent with the previous literature (see, e.g., the survey by Parker 2009, chs. 4 and 10.1.3), the self-employed in our sample are older and better educated than paid employees and more willing to take risks. Also, the share of those with a self-employed father is higher among the self-employed than among paid employees or non-employed, and this particularly applies to employers. Employers are more often married and have more children on average than do solo self-employed. By controlling for (lagged) household income, we also take account of income shocks that may promote the transition from solo self-employment to employership. 3 self-employment, estimated to be 3.312 (S.E.=0.239), shows a clear increase in the probability of solo self-employment relative to the probability of non-employment (i.e., an increase in the log odds) when the individual was solo self-employed in the previous year. Furthermore, the parameter of cross state dependence, estimated to be 2.665 (S.E.=0.278), points to a stepping stone effect, as the probability of employership increases relative to the probability of non-employment when the previous state is solo self-employment. We provide a more detailed quantitative interpretation of the results below.
Results
The coefficients of the socioeconomic control variables show interesting patterns. The estimates of the equations for solo self-employment and employership tend to have the same sign and magnitude. 4 Therefore, solo self-employment and employership appear to be similar states with correspondingly similar determinants. That said, father's self-employment appears to play a more important role for employership than for solo self-employment.
The results for the random part of the model show that the variances of the random effects for solo self-employment and employership are larger than the variance for paid employment. This implies that unobserved factors are more important for explaining tastes for solo self-employment or for employership than for explaining tastes for paid employment. In addition, there is a positive correlation between the random effects for solo self-employment and employership, suggesting that those who prefer solo self-employment to non-working also tend to prefer employership to non-working. between the four labor market states in consecutive years, separately for men and women, based on the estimates of our multionmial logit models. Conditional on being solo self-employed in a given year, the probabilities of being solo self-employed in the next year amount to about 15.6%
(95%-CI: 12.5% -18.7%) and 10.7% (95%-CI: 8.3% -13.0%) for men and women, respectively.
Interestingly, these probabilities are considerably lower than the observed probability of about 77%, which does not account for individual characteristics (see Panel A in Figures 1 and 2 for men and women, respectively). Hence, the persistence observed in the raw data can, to a large extent, be explained by observed and unobserved individual characteristics that are controlled for in our dynamic multinomial logit models. Likewise, the model-based predictions for transitions from solo self-employment to employership in two consecutive years amount to about 9.0% (95%-CI:
7.5% -10.4%) and 3.0% (CI: 1.8% -4.2%) for males and females, respectively, as compared to about 13% and 7% when individual characteristics are not controlled for.
Next, we calculate the extent of true state dependence from these probabilities, as explained in section 2. Table 6 shows that true state dependence in solo self-employment appears to be small. For men, being solo self-employed in the last year increases the probability of being solo self-employed in this year (i.e. true state dependence) by about 13.3 (9.6) percentage points compared to being in paid employment (non-employment) in the last year. The effect of solo self-employment on transitioning to employership (i.e. cross state dependence) is not big either, amounting to a 5.1 (4.9) percentage points increase compared to paid employment (nonemployment). 5 For women, state dependence and cross state dependence appear to be even lower.
Next, we illustrate how choices of labor market states respond to temporary, exogenous shifts in employment states. For instance, a person may be selected for a program that subsidizes startups. We assume that the program lasts for 1 year. Since our model controls for observed and unobserved individual characteristics, the model-based predictions are indicative of the effect of being in the subsidized state for one year on the labor market choices in subsequent years. shift has only short-run effects. For men, having been in solo self-employment instead of paid employment has practically zero effect on the probability of being an employer already three years later and the effect on solo self-employment fully disappears after four years (cf. Figure 3, Panel A). From a policy perspective, it is probably more important to look at the effect of bringing someone in solo self-employment instead of non-employment. Here, the effect approaches practically zero after two years for all four states (cf. Figure 3, Panel B ). For women, the effect of solo self-employment on future solo self-employment or employership is also only discernible for one year, regardless whether paid employment or non-employment is the alternative status (cf. Figure 4 , Panels A and B). There are, however, some adverse effects of solo self-employment instead of paid employment for women as their hazard of being non-employed increases for some years. Conversely, having been solo self-employed instead of non-employed seems to increase the likelihood of paid employment in the future for women.
All in all, these results show that the substantial persistence in solo self-employment and its ostensible stepping-stone effect visible in the descriptive statistics are mainly due to observed and unobserved individual characteristics. When controlling for characteristics, the effect of solo self-employment appears to be small and generally not lasting longer than one year. 6
Conclusions
This paper studied the dynamics of solo self-employment using data from the German SOEP 2000 to 2012. Looking at actual transitions, we found considerable persistence in solo selfemployment, albeit much lower than in paid employment. After five years, about a third of those initially solo self-employed are still solo self-employed. In addition, transition rates to employership are much higher from solo self-employment than from paid employment or nonemployment.
Multivariate analyses using dynamic multinomial logit models with random effects showed, however, that these dynamics are primarily due to spurious rather than true state dependence, i.e., they are mainly caused by selection into self-employment based on observed and unobserved individual characteristics. The genuine effect of experiencing solo self-employment on future solo self-employment or employership is small and generally not lasting longer than one year.
These findings are consistent with the view that individuals predominantly enter entrepreneurship on a small scale, i.e., as solo self-employed, in order to learn about their aptitude for entrepreneurship (see, e.g., Jovanovic 1982) . After having discovered their entrepreneurial talent, they either expand their business, moving to employership, or switch back to paid employment accordingly. On the other hand, individuals may also increase their entrepreneurial ability by working in self-employment (cf., e.g., Minniti and Bygrave 2001) but if "learning by doing" played a major role, the extent of true (cross) state dependence should probably be higher.
The fact that we find little true state dependence in solo self-employment also implies that policy measures that bring individuals into solo self-employment, like the German Grün-dungszuschuss, a start-up subsidies for the unemployed, may have predominantly short-run effects. They might incentivize individuals to work in self-employment as long as these subsidies are paid. However, the incentive is expected to disappear after the program ended. As true cross state dependence from solo self-employment to employership is also low, expectations for yielding a "double dividend" by turning unemployed into self-employed who later become employers and create jobs for others seem unfounded. This should be kept in mind when weighing up the costs and benefits of such programs. Figure 1 Observed probabilities of labor market state conditional on labor market state t years ago for males 
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